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LEGALITY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE OF NICARAGUA
International law consists of a body of rules that govern the relations
among nations ("states").' These rules of conduct for the international
community of states have evolved primarily through international custom
and international agreements. 2 International custom and international agree-
ments, therefore, are the principal means by which to determine the legality
of a state's conduct vis-a-vis one or more other nations. 3 One of the most
significant aspects of any state's transnational conduct involves the state's
!. See generally L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955)
(discussing traditional bases of international law); M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1984) (elements of international law with emphasis on contem-
porary application).
2. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 13. The need and desire for orderly interaction
among states necessitated some rules of international conduct. Id. at 17. As states reacted to
particular situations in the same or similar manner, single usages grew into customary practice.
Id. For example, with but a few exceptions, belligerent states historically refrained from seizing
the fishing vessels of one another during times of war. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
686-700 (1900) (discussing historical evolution of private fishing vessels' exemption from
capture). The practice of refraining from capturing fishing vessels gradually evolved into a rule
of conduct, the violation of which constituted a breach of international law. Id. Custom,
however, was not always sufficiently clear; therefore, states gradually began to conclude
international agreements in order to codify rules for future conduct. OPPENHEIM, supra note I,
at 17-18. The first stage of the codification process, from the 1860s to the end of World War
1, consisted of attempts to codify the rules of conduct of nations relating to the settlement of
disputes and the regulation of warfare. See D.W. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-14 (2d ed.
1976) (summarizing evolution of codification and law-making process of international law);
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, April 6, 1856, 115 C.T.S. 1 (international regulations
for naval warfare); Convention With Respect to Law and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (codifying international rules of land warfare); Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, T.S. No. 392 (codification
of international dispute resolution procedures); Convention Respecting Neutral Powers and
Persons in War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540 (rights and duties of
neutrals in land warfare); Convention Respecting Neutral Powers in Maritime War, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545 (rights and duties of neutral states in sea warfare). The
Conference for the Codification of International Law, held at the Hague in 1930, exemplified
a concern for peacetime law in the second phase of the codification process. See Conference
for the Codification of International Law, March-April 1930, reprinted in 24 AM. J. INT'L L.
169-191 (1930) (convention addressing issues of nationality, legal status of territorial sea, and
responsibility of states); OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 62-63 (discussing Conference for Codifi-
cation of International Law). The third and most recent stage of the codification process
involves the efforts of the United Nations to codify international law with assistance from the
International Law Commission (ILC). See U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. 1(a) (General Assembly
of United Nations shall encourage development and codification of international law).
3. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (list of traditional sources
of international law); infra notes 23-49 and accompanying text (discussing traditional sources
of international law).
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economic interaction with other nations.4 While every state normally attempts
to facilitate its own economic prosperity through advantageous trade policies,
many nations, including the United States, have employed economic sanctions5
to attain political objectives. 6 The United States termination of trade with
Nicaragua is an example of an economic policy designed to influence the
political behavior of a target state. 7 The continued use of economic sanctions,
such as the measures the United States has imposed upon Nicaragua, raises
serious questions concerning the legality of certain economic sanctions under
international law.
Before embarking upon an analysis of the legality of any specific
economic measures, a brief discussion of the nature of international law is
helpful and necessary. The concept of an existing system of law that obliges
adherence from states of the international community admittedly is a cum-
4. See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 200 (2d ed. 1979) (economic relations between
states are basis of international relations).
5. See H. Moyer & L. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The
History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus.
1 (1983) (disrpissing use of economic sanctions, including case studies of sanctions imposed
upon Iran, Afghanistan, and Poland). An economic sanction is an action taken by a state or
international organization to prevent, regulate, or otherwise hinder economic intercourse with
another state for the purpose of condemning or influencing the target state's action or policies.
Id. at 2 n.1.
6. See G. HUFFBAUER & J. SCHOUT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY
GOALS, POLICY ANALYSES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 4-22 (1983) (chronological summary of
economic sanctions to promote foreign policy goals); R. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the
New International Economic Order: A Second Look at Some First Impressions, 16 VA. J. INT'L
L. 233, 234 (1976) (discussing method to analyze legality of economic sanctions); Moyer &
Mabry, supra note 5, at 2-8 (discussing United States' willingness to employ economic sanctions).
The practice of using economic pressure as a foreign policy tool is not a recent development.
See Lillich, supra, at 234 (economic coercion in international relations dates back to 1648). In
colonial times, the United States imposed economic sanctions upon Great Britain to protest
discriminatory tax legislation. See HUFFBAUER & SCHOUT, supra at 23-27 (selected pre-World
War I instances of economic sanctions for foreign policy goals); R. RENWICK, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS 4-8 (1981) (discussing early American embargoes). Historically, however, states
primarily imposed coercive economic measures upon other states as an adjunct to the practice
of war. See HUFBAUER & SCHOUT, supra, at 4-5 (pre-World War II sanctions generally employed
as part of war effort). For example, Britain and France regularly attempted to isolate one
another economically through the use of blockades during the Napoleonic Wars from 1793 to
1815. See F. Crouzet, Wars, Blockades and Economic Change in Europe: 1797-1815, J. OF
ECON. HIST. 567-88 (1964) (account of economic impact of naval blockades), cited in D.
LOSMAN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 2 n.1 (1979). The emergence of the use of
economic sanctions in a nonmilitary context essentially is a product of the twentieth century.
RENWICK, supra, at 4. Examples of the use of economic sanctions for political purposes by the
United States include a freezing of Iranian assets in the United States, prohibition of trade with
Iran in 1979, and a grain and high technology embargo against the Soviet Union in 1980. See
Moyer & Mabry, supra note 5, at 10-14, 28-36 (examining programs of United States sanctions
against Iran and Soviet Union).
7. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing sanctions imposed against
Nicaragua); notes 167-68 and accompanying text (objectives of U.S. sanctions against Nicara-
gua).
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bersome idea. 8 The decentralized structure of the international legal system
fuels skepticism as to the efficacy of international law.9 No international
legislature having the authority to promulgate binding rules of law exists.' 0
International law also does not provide for an executive institution to enforce
rules for state conduct," nor for a judiciary body that can exercise compul-
sory jurisdiction over the international community of states.'2
8. See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (lack of traditional demarcated divisions
of government enhance ephemeral quality of international law).
9. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 7 (lack of sovereign political authority to enforce
body of international rules is historical source of skepticism); AKEHuRST, supra note I, at 5
(absence of international legislature prompted denial of legal force international law). Modern
cynicism toward international law continues to focus on the lack of a centralized executive body
to enforce the law, as well as the absence of obligatory judicial settlement. AKEHUEsT, supra
note I, at 5. Critics argue that since rules fetter the freedom of sovereign nations, governments
will not adhere to obligations under international law unless some external authority can enforce
compliance with international obligations. See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 49 (discussing critics'
argument of reasons why states violate international law). Professor Henkin posits that the
assumption that nations violate international law because of an absence of any enforcement
mechanism is erroneous. Id.
10. See BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (3d ed. 1979) (inter-
national system of law lacks legislative machinery common to domestic legal systems). While
the General Assembly of the United Nations (General Assembly) certainly impacts upon the
development of international law, the General Assembly lacks the authority to legislate in the
commonly understood sense of the word. R. HIGGINs, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 5 (1963). Resolutions of the
General Assembly often embody principles of general international law. Id. Principles of
international law, however, would be binding upon member states to the United Nations
regardless of a resolution. Id. The only per se binding effect over member states that the
General Assembly maintains is with regard to internal administrative matters. See L. GOODRICH,
THE UNITED NATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 15 (1974) (General Assembly only intended to be
legislative with regard to internal ministerial matters).
11. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 100-02 (6th ed. 1963) (international community
has no organ that can compel compliance with rules of international law). But see HENKIN,
supra note 4, at 24, 49 (preoccupation with absence of enforcement mechanism with which to
punish states in violation of international law is misplaced). The United Nations Security Council
(Security Council) has limited executive power to enforce provisions of the United Nations
Charter and to maintain international peace and security. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-54
(specific powers granted to Security Council to perform Security Council's duty of carrying out
provisions of U.N. Charter and maintaining international peace and security); see generally L.
GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO, P. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 192-369 (3d ed. 1969) (discussing the role of Security Council under United Nations
Charter) [hereinafter cited as GOODRICH & HASmRo]. While the Security Council has the power
to make binding decisions in situations that directly threaten peace and security, the decisions
only can bind members of the United Nations. See GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra, at 209, 311-
17 (U.N. Charter obligates members of U.N. to carry out decisions by Security Council calling
for collective sanctions under articles 41 & 42 of U.N. Charter). In addition, each of the five
permanent members of the Security Council (United States, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, China,
and France) has the power to veto any proposal that the Security Council might otherwise pass.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 27. The divergence of interests among the permanent members of the
Security Council renders a decision calling for sanctions virtually impossible. See GOODRICH &
HAMBRO, supra, at 227-28 (discussing use of veto power in Security Council).
12. See AKEHURST, supra note 1, at 5 (states need not submit to jurisdiction of interna-
tional tribunal). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the
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In the absence of a sovereign political authority to promulgate and
enforce the rules of international law effectively, the common interest of
states emerges as the primary inducement for adherence to international
law. 3 Nations share an interest in maintaining orderly interaction in their
transnational relations.' 4 As states are largely interdependent in many ways,
including international trade, a set of rules to govern matters such as trade
enhances international cooperation and benefits all states.1S The fact that
adherence to international law generally is in the best interests of states does
not imply that all states consistently comply with the rules of international
law.' 6 Contrary to popular belief, however, adherence to international law
in daily relations is much more common than noncompliance. 7 While
compliance with the rules of international law is the general norm among
nations, the rules of international law do not bind all states at all times.' 8
The rules of international law have evolved through the common consent of
states, and a proposed rule of international law binds no nation that has not
consented to a rule, either expressly or impliedly. t9 A state explicitly may
United Nations U.N. CHARTER arts. 7(1), 92. The consent of the parties to a dispute forms the
basis of the ICJ's jurisdiction. See 0. LISSITZYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 61-68
(1951) (discussing ICJ's jurisdiction); GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 11, at 550-52 (jurisdic-
tional base of ICJ under United Nations Charter). Under article 36(1) of the Statute of the
ICJ, parties may agree to submit a specific dispute to the ICJ for resolution. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 36(1). States often manifest consent to jurisdiction under
article 36(1) by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements that provide for the submission of
a particular type of dispute to the ICJ. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note I1, at 551. Article
36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ permits a state to accept as compulsory the jurisdiction of the
ICJ through unilateral declarations. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(2). As
of 1984, 47 unilateral declarations accepting as compulsory the jurisdiction of the ICJ were in
force. See 38 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE YEARBOOK 57-91 (1983-1984) (texts of unilateral
declarations).
13. See AKEHURST, supra note 1, at 8 (interests of states are to agree to international
rules).
14. Id.
15. See id. (established rule of interaction serves states' interests more favorably than do
spontaneous tests of strength on case-by-case basis). Commonality of interest that states share
is not the only inducement for states to comply with international law. Id. at 6. A state that
commits an illegal act against a target state faces the possibility that the target state will resort
to measures of self-help against the state that originally took illegal action. Id.; seel also infra
notes 182-83, 186-90 and accompanying text (discussing self-help measures of self-defense,
retorsion and reprisal). Foreign policy considerations, such as the preservation of international
credibility, also may deter a state from violating international law. See HENKIN, supra note 4,
at 50-56 (foreign policy reasons for observing international law).
16. See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 48 (reality may not warrant broad assertion of compliance
with international law).
17. See id. at 47. While violations of international norms of conduct receive much public-
ity, the daily observance by states of principles of international law go largely unnoticed. Id.
18. See id. at 33 (consent of state necessary for proposed rule to bind that state).
19. See id. (discussing formation of international law through principle of unanimity). If
a state desires not to be bound by a rule of customary international law, the state must manifest
its intention not to follow the rule at an early stage in the rule's development, and thereafter
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nanifest its consent to a rule through a treaty or other form of declaration,
20
or a nation may act in such a manner as to imply its tacit consent to a rule
of international conduct. 2' Therefore, if a state neither supports nor protests
against an international rule, the state tacitly has consented to comply with
the rule.2
The most common sources of international law appear in article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 23 The article 38
sources of international law are international conventions (treaties), inter-
national custom that evinces a general practice accepted as law, general
principles of law acknowledged by civilized states, judicial decisions and the
writings of internationally respected commentators. 24 Although the function
of article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ is to set forth the categories of legal
rules that the ICJ will apply in settling disputes, 2 most courts and commen-
tators regard article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ as an adequate declaration
of the sources of international law.
26
consistently express opposition to the rule. See M. Akehurst, Custom As a Source of Interna-
tional Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 24 (1977) (state that waits until customary rule is firmly
established before expressing opposition will be bound by rule). Some principles of international
law, however, may be of such peremptory importance, or jus cogens, that the principles may
bind all states of the international community, regardless of consent. See BROWNIE, supra note
10, at 512-15. Examples of international rules of jus cogens include the proscription of genocide,
the law against aggressive war, the prohibition of slave-trading, and the principle of racial non-
discrimination. Id. at 513.
20. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (states may undertake obligations under
international law through treaties).
21. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 24 (rule of international law may bind state that does
not object to such rule).
22. See id. (inaction by state will connote willingness to obey rule).
23. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 49 Stat. 1031, T.I.A.S.
No. 93 [hereinafter cited as Statute of the ICJ]. The Statute of the ICJ is an integral part of
the United Nations Charter, and prescribes the rules of operation for the International Court
of Justice (ICJ). See U.N. CHARTER art. 92 (Statute of ICJ annexed to U.N. Charter).
24. See Statute of the ICJ, supra note 23, at art. 38(1) (list of traditional sources of
international law); see also infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing treaties as
source of international law); infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (discussing custom as
source of international law); infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing general
principles of law as source of international law); infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text
(discussing judicial decisions and writings of scholars as source of international law).
25. See GRIEG, supra note 2, at 6-7. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ instructs the
ICJ on where to look for international law. Id.; Statute of the ICJ, supra note 23, at art. 38(1).
Article 38(l) of the Statute of the ICJ directs not only the ICJ in the application of international
law, but any judicial body that must apply international law. See BRIERLY, supra note 11, at 56
(article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ applies to any judicial body that administers international
law).
26. See AKEH U R, supra note 1, at 23 (article 38(l) of Statute of ICJ constitutes most
widely accepted list of sources of international law); E. MCWHINNEY, THE WORLD COURT AND
THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw-MAKING PROCESS 2-3 (1979) (discussing sources of
international law); C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-27 (1965)
(concluding that article 38(1) of Statute of ICJ reflects crux of sources of international law and
discussing efficacy of article 38(1)). But see A. Ross, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83
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The first source of international law listed in the Statute of the ICJ is
international conventions. 27 An international convention is synonymous with
the term "treaty" in the parlance of international law. 28 A treaty is an
agreement concluded between two or more states or international organiza-
tions that creates a relationship within the context of international law. 29
Treaties play a major role in helping to facilitate orderly interaction among
states by setting forth general norms of conduct for the parties to the treaties
and constituting evidence of customary rules of international law. 0 Most
importantly, treaties provide a legal framework within which states are able
to conduct relations with one another in particular areas of interaction."
The second source of international law listed in article 38 of the Statute
(1947) (article 38(1) of Statute of ICJ does not constitute foundation of sources of international
law); GRrEG, supra note 2, at 7 (article 38(1) of Statute of ICJ is outdated and incomplete as
enumeration of sources of international law). In addition to treaties, custom, general principles
of law, judicial decisions and scholarly opinion, acts of international organizations are a
potential source of modern international law that is not listed in article 38(1) of the Statute of
the ICJ. See GRIEG, supra note 2, at 7 (proliferation of international organizations has prompted
growth of specialized field of "international administrative law").
27. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 23, at art. 38(l)(a).
28. See AKEhsrT, supra note 1, at 23-24 (convention only can mean treaty in international
law).
29. See A. McNAm, LAW OF TREATIES 3-4 (1961) (treatise on function of international
treaties).
30. See AKEHURST, supra note 1, at 23-25 (discussing contemporary significance of treaties
in international law); BRIERLY, supra note 11, at 57-59 (discussing treaties as a source of
international law); BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 12-13 (discussing influence of treaties on content
of international law); OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at § 492 (discussing quasi-legislative character
of lawmaking treaties). A lawmaking treaty is a legally binding agreement that lays down
general rules of conduct for the signatories to the treaty. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 12.
Examples of general lawmaking treaties include the 1856 Declaration of Paris on neutrality in
maritime warfare, the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Conventions on law of war and neutrality,
1948 Genocide Convention. Id. at 12. The general rule is that a treaty binds only its signatories.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention], reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). Article 34
of the Vienna Convention states that a treaty creates neither rights nor obligations for a
nonparty state, without the consent of that state. Id. However, a treaty also may have a legal
effect upon nonparties. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 12-13, 619-22 (by conduct, nonparty
states recognize provisions of multilateral treaty and thereby accept treaty as obligatory);
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 6 § 102 (1985)
(multilateral agreements broadly accepted by states and not rejected .by significant number of
large states may become binding on nonparties if nonparties indicate acceptance through
conduct). But see BRIERLY, supra note 1 I, at 58 (even large conventions do not bind nonparties
because treaties can bind only signatories).
31. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER (1945) (multilateral convention concluded to effect peaceful
coexistence and international cooperation); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5) A3 (6), A1365, T.I.A.S. No. 1200, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 (multilateral convention designed to facilitate international trade and free flow of commerce);
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, 4 U.S.T.
2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (bilateral treaty concluded to promote economic and cultural relations
between United States and Japan).
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of the ICJ is custom that evinces a general practice accepted as law. 32 The
actual practice of states creates rules of customary international law, but the
issue of what actually constitutes state practice in the determination of
custom has generated a significant amount of debate. 33 In order for state
practice to become binding custom, the practice will necessitate a certain
degree of repetitiveness and consistency. 34 The amount of practice necessary
to establish custom largely is dependent upon how well-established a prior
practice is and the amount of existing practice that conflicts with the proposed
rule.35 Generally, the more solidified an existing rule is in terms of duration
and widespread acceptance, the greater difficulty states will have in over-
turning the existing rule. 36 Custom involves not only following a practice
with a requisite amount of regularity, but also adhering to the practice out
of a sense of legal obligation. 37 Opinio juris is the term for a state's
psychological conviction that international law obligates that state to adhere
to a rule of international law.3 Although the opinio juris is a necessary
32. Statute of ICJ, supra note 23, at art. 38(l)(b).
33. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 1-10 (claims or assertions of states constitutes practice
that can formulate custom). But see D'AMATo, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 88 (1971) (only physical, overt acts can constitute material element of custom). The
generally accepted view of customary international law is that state practice can create custom
not only through overt acts, but through claims and assertions of the state as well. See Akehurst,
supra note 19, at 2 (proposition that only physical acts make up state practice is minority view);
BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 5 (evidences of custom include diplomatic correspondence, opinions
of official legal advisers, executive pronouncements, international and national judicial decisions,
treaties, and resolutions from United Nations General Assembly). The continuous process of
interaction between states, by which one state unilaterally declares a position to which other
states react, plays an integral role in the formation of customary law. See Akehurst, supra note
19, at 37 (if state asserts a position as in accordance with international law and other states
acquiesce, then new rule of customary law emerges); see also M. McDougal, The Hydrogen
Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 356, 356-57 (1955) (states
carry out process of international lawmaking by interacting constantly with one another).
34. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 6-7 (discussing requisite elements of custom);
Akehurst, supra note 19, at 12-31 (discussing quantity and consistency of practice needed to
form custom).
35. See Akehurst, supra note 19, at 19 (amount of practice required to overturn established
rule of custom is greater than amount of practice necessary to change more tenuous custom).
36. Id.; see Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116. In the Fisheries Case, the
United Kingdom sought, inter alia, to establish a customary rule of international law out of
certain states' practice of limiting fishing lines across bays to 10 miles. Id. at 131. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the 10 mile delimitation was not uniform among
states, and therefore could not bind Norway. Id. As an alternative basis for its holding, the
ICJ held that the 10 mile rule could not bind Norway because Norway consistently had opposed
all efforts to apply the 10 mile rule to the Norwegian coast. Id.; see also supra note 19 and
accompanying text (state may opt out of rule of custom if state expresses opposition at an early
stage of rule's development).
37. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 8-10 (discussing psychological element of state
practice necessary to establish custom); Akehurst, supra note 19, at 31-42 (discussing custom's
requirement of opiniojuris); PARRY, supra note 26, at 61-62 (significant part of customary rule
of international law is that states believe the rule to bind).
38. PARRY, supra note 26, at 61.
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element of a rule of custom, 39 the determination of whether a state follows
a course of conduct out of a sense of legal duty, or simply because that
particular course of conduct is politically expedient, is seldom unequivocal.'
Third among the sources of international law in article 38 of the Statute
of the ICJ are general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 4'
The general principles of law to which article 38 refers are fundamental legal
principles common to the jurisprudence of civilized legal systems. 42 The
examination of the well developed legal systems of independent states assists
the ICJ and other international tribunals in formulating homogenous inter-
national juridical principles. 43 The function of article 38(1)(c) of the Statute
of the ICJ is to provide the ICJ with a source of legal principles upon which
39. See The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, no. 9, at 4
[hereinafter cited as Lotus]. In Lotus, France argued the existence of a customary rule of
international law that granted exclusive criminal jurisdiction in ship collision cases to the state
whose flag the ship flew (flag state). Id. at 27-28. As evidence of a custom granting exclusive
jurisdiction to flag states, France proferred that in previous collision cases, criminal prosecutions
had come before only the courts of flag states. Id. at 28. The abstention of nonflag states from
prosecuting collision cases, France argued, manifested an international custom that only flag
states could prosecute collision cases. Id. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ),
however, refused to find prima facie existence of opinio juris through abstention. Id. The Lotus
court held that the paucity of decisions by criminal courts on collision cases might denote
abstention on the part of nonflag states, but such rarity of decisions could not show that
nonflag states based their inaction on a conscious belief in a legal duty to abstain. Id. But see
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS DEVELOPED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 384-86 (1958) (consistent practice of states, whether positive conduct or continuous
abstention, is prima facie evidence of opinio juris).
40. See AKEHURST, supra note 1, at 29-30 (assessment of opinio juris). Attempting to
determine the psychology of a nation to ascertain whether a state follows a certain course of
conduct out of a sense of legal duty (opinionjuris) involves inherent artificiality. Id. at 29. The
better method is to infer opinio juris from not only the physical acts of states, but official
statements as well. Id. at 30. Therefore, if a state claims to be acting because of a legal
obligation, yet in reality it is political self-interest that drives the state, international law will
disregard the actual motivating reasons behind the state's action and look to the state's expression
iof legal obligation to find opinio juris. Id.
41. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 23, at art. 38(l)(c). See generally B. CHENG, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1953) (treatise on
relation between general principles of law and international law); A. McNair, The General
Principles of Law Recognized By Civilized Nations, 33 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1957) (discussing
article 38 general principles of law).
42. See Ross, supra note 26, at 90 (discussing general principles of law as listed in article
38 of Statute of ICJ). Examples of general principles of law in article 38 of the Statute of the
ICJ include prescription, estoppel, and res judicata. BRIERLY, supra note 1 I, at 63.
43. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 16 (international tribunals have drawn concepts from
principles of domestic law in order to make application of international law more practicable
in judicial process). Professor Ross posits that custom and treaties, as sources of international
law, differ from general principles of law. See Ross, supra note 26, at 90-91. Through custom
and treaties, objective rules of international law may develop without regard to particular legal
questions. Id. Such an abstract development of international rules from general principles of
law is unlikely because states formulate general principles of law in response to particular legal
questions, thus giving article 38(1)(c) principles a subjective character. Id.
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to draw in the event that no treaties or customs exist that are relevant to a
particular dispute.4'
As a fourth source of international law, article 38 of the Statute of the
ICJ lists judicial decisions and the writings of international publicists.45
Judicial decisions, as referred to in article 38, represent decisions from
international tribunals and domestic courts. 46 Although listed as a subsidiary
means for ascertaining the rule- uf international law,47 judicial decisions have
had a significant effect on the determination and development of the body
of international rules. 48 To a lesser degree, the writings of respected publicists
also may influence the rubric of international law by stating the current
content of the law and opining what the law should be.
49
Although the Statute of the ICJ lists four sources of international law,
treaties and international custom constitute the two principal sources of
international law and thus are the primary means of ascertaining the legality
of state conduct under international law and, in particular, the legality of
economic sanctions. -0 Economic sanctions are a historical means by which
states influence the domestic and foreign policies of other states. 5' Since
World War II, the practice of economic coercion increasingly has permeated
international economic relations among states.5 2 The United States has chosen
44. See AKEhURST, supra note 1, at 34 (purpose of general principles of law in article 38
of Statute of ICJ is to provide assistance for cases in which treaties and custom are not
available).
45. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 23, at art. 38(l)(d).
46. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 20-25 (discussing judicial decisions as source of
international law). Examples of the tribunals from which article 38 judicial decisions may
emanate include the International Court of Justice (ICJ), international arbitral tribunals, the
Court of Justice of the European: Communities, national courts, and ad hoc international
military tribunals. Id.
47. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 23, at art. 38(1)(d).
48. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686-700 (1900) (United States Supreme
Court decision evidencing customary international law); Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951
I.C.J. 116, 428-29 (opinion of ICJ that effectively created new rule of international law for
demarcation of fishing boundaries in areas of atypical geography);. Reparation for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 187-88 (advisory opinion of ICJ
on capacity of United Nations to assert rights as organization in international claims) [hereinafter
cited as Reparation Case]; see also GRIEG, supra note 2, at 41-42 (discussing Reparation Case
and Fisheries Case).
49. See BRIERLY, supra note 11, at 65-66 (publicist's influence on rules of international
law depends upon prestige of publicist and persuasiveness of argument). Examples of historically
influential writers on international law include Grotius, Hall, Oppenheim, Hyde, Guggenheim,
and Verdross. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 25; cf. PARRY, supra note 26, at 104 (relevance of
publicists as source of international law decreases as number of judicial decisions grows).
50. See OPPENHEIM, supra note I, at §§ 16-18 (treaties and custom are two fundamental
sources of international law); D. Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J.
INT'L L. 245, 245-49 (1976) (discussing criteria for examining legality of economic conduct by
states).
51. See supra note 6 (historical development of economic sanctions); supra note 5 (defining
economic sanctions).
52. See M. NINcIc & P. WALLENsTEEN, DrLEMMAs OF ECONOMIC COERCION 1-5 (1983)
(discussing growth of economic coercion). Economic coercion is the infliction by one state of
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not to exclude itself from the proliferation of coercive economic practice. 3
In fact, the willingness of the United States to employ economic sanctions is
a salient aspect of post-1945 international economic relations. 4 As of May
1985, the United States was maintaining at least seven programs of economic
sanctions against twelve nations as responses to various actions or patterns
of behavior engaged in by the target states. 5
A cogent example of economic sanctions imposed by the United States
to attain political goals is the comprehensive trade embargo levied against
the government of Nicaragua on May 1, 1985 .56 Acting pursuant to the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA)57 and the
punitive economic measures upon another state for the purpose of achieving a political goal.
Id. Insofar as economic coercion and economic sanctions denote adverse economic action that
seeks to alter another state's behavior, this article will use the terms "economic coercion" and
"economic sanction" interchangeably. See supra note 5 (definition of economic sanction).
Examples of post-World War II programs of economic sanctions include the Soviet Union's
termination of trade with Yugoslavia in 1948, the Arab oil embargo imposed upon the United
States another industrial nations in 1973, and the prohibition of Argentina imports and freezing
of Argentina assets conducted by Great Britain in 1982. See M.S. DAOUDI & M.S. DAJANI,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE 104-08, 112-24 (1983) (discussing Arab oil
embargo, and sanctions levied against Argentina and Yugoslavia).
53. See Williams, The Coming of Economic Sanctions into American Practice, 37 AM. J.
INT'L L. 386 (1943) (discussing origins of twentieth century American sanctions); see also infra
note 54 (examples of economic sanctions implemented by United States).
54. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 5, at 2-8 (discussing United States recent proliferation
of economic sanctions). In 1960, strained relations between the United States and Cuba prompted
the United States to impose a trade embargo against the revolutionary government of Fidel
Castro. See D. LOSMAN, supra note 6, at 20-46 (discussing United States embargo of Cuba).
In response to the atrocities of Idi Amin's regime, the United States terminated virtually all
trade with Uganda in 1978. See Comment, U.S. Trade Sanctions Against Uganda: Legality
Under International Law, II L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1149, 1149-69 (1979) (examining United
States embargo of Uganda). An additional prominent example of United States economic sanc-
tions is the trade boycott and other measures the United States imposed against Iran in 1979
in response to the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note
5, at 8-27 (discussing economic measures taken against Iran). Additional states against which
the United States has imposed punitive economic measures for political reasons since 1978 in-
clude Argentina, the U.S.S.R., South Africa, Libya, Poland, and Nicaragua. Id. at 5 n.13.
55. See C. Joyner, The Transnational Boycott as Economic Coercion in International
Law: Policy, Place, and Practice, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 205, 222-23 (1984). The nations
against which the United States maintained economic restrictions as of May 1, 1985, include
North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, the Soviet Union (Latvia,
Estonia and Lithuania), Cuba, Iran, and Nicaragua. Id. at 222-23; infra note 59 (sanctions
against Nicaragua).
56. Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §
540); see also infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing economic sanctions imposed
upon Nicaragua).
57. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982). The International Economic Emergency Powers Act
of 1977 (IEEPA) authorizes the President to prohibit imports from or exports to any foreign
nation. Id. at § 1702. The President may exercise his authority under the IEEPA only after the
President has declared a national emergency in response to an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the United States. Id. at § 1701; see also M. Malloy, Embargo Programs of the United States
Treasury Department, 20 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 492-96 (1981) (discussing IEEPA); 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4540-45 (legislative history and purpose of IEEPA).
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National Emergencies Act of 1976 (NEA),58 President Reagan placed a total
embargo on all trade with Nicaragua and suspended service to the United
States by Nicaraguan airlines and flag vessels.5 9 President Reagan's sanctions
also included notification to the Nicaraguan government of the United States
intention to terminate a 1956 bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation (FCN Treaty)60 between the United States and Nicaragua. 6'
The termination by the Reagan Administration of all economic inter-
course with the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in May 1985 reflects
the general deterioration of relations between the United States and Nicara-
gua since 1979.62 In July 1979, the Frente Sandinista Liberacion Nacional
(FSLN or Sandinista) led a revolution in Nicaragua that ended the dictator-
ship of General Anastasio Samoza Debayle and eventually led to a FSLN-
dominated government in Nicaragua. 63 Initially, the Carter Administration
58. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982). The National Emergencies Act of 1976 (NEA)
terminates, as of September 14, 1978, any statutory authority that the President possessed as a
result of declared states of emergency, and delimits the authority of the President to declare
future national emergencies. See id. at § 1601 (cancelling power of Executive that resulted from
existing states of emergency); id. at § 1621 (authorizing President to declare future national
emergencies in accordance with procedures of NEA). The NEA also provides for congressional
oversight and review of Executive actions taken pursuant to the declaration of a national
emergency. See id. at § 1622 (providing for congressional review of presidentially-declared
emergencies and termination of states of emergencies by concurrent resolution); id. at § 1631
(requiring President to specify statutory authority under which Executive Branch -acts pursuant
to national emergency); id. at § 1641 (requiring reporting and accountability procedures of
President); see also 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2288-314 (legislative history and purpose
of NEA).
59. Exec. Order No. 12,513, supra note 56; see also 50 Fed. Reg. 19,890-95 (1985)
(Treasury regulations concerning trade with Nicaragua). Executive Order No. 12,513 bans all
Nicaraguan imports to the United States and all exports from the United States to Nicaragua.
50 Fed. Reg. 19,890-91 (1985) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 540.204, 540.205). President
Reagan's executive order also forbids flights to and from the United States by Nicaraguan
aircraft, and precludes Nicaraguan flag vessels from entering United States ports. Id. at 19,891
(to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 540.206, 540.207). The trade embargo against Nicaragua,
however, does not apply to donated articles such as food, clothing, and medicine for humani-
tarian purposes, nor to supplies for the antigovernment guerrillas ("contras"). Id. (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. § 540.205).
60. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Jan. 26, 1956, United States -
Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024.
61. See Statement By the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, 21 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 568 (May 1, 1985) (announcement of United States sanctions against
Nicaragua and intent to terminate FCN treaty); U.S. Diplomatic Note concerning Termination
of FCN Treaty, May 1, 1985, 24 INT'L LEG. MAT. 815-16 (1985) (note from United States
Embassy in Nicaragua to Nicaraguan Ministry of External Relations notifying Nicaraguan
government of United States intention to terminate FCN Treaty pursuant to article 25(3) of
FCN Treaty); FCN Treaty, supra note 60, at art. 25(3). Article 25(3) of the FCN Treaty allows
either the United States or Nicaragua to terminate the FCN Treaty by giving one year's written
notice to the other party. Id. See also infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (discussing
notification provision of FCN Treaty).
62. See E. CRAWLEY, NICARAGUA IN PERSPECrIVE 169-86 (1984) (general account of
Nicaraguan revolution and post-1979 relations with United States).
63. See id. at 173 (Samoza regime collapsed on July 17, 1979); see also infra note 65 and
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adopted a policy of economic assistance and cooperation with the revolu-
tionary government of Nicaragua. 64 As the Sandinista leaders began to
consolidate their power within the new government, 6 however, evidence
mounted that Nicaragua was assisting insurgents in El Salvador who were
attempting to overthrow the United States-supported Salvadoran govern-
ment. 66 In response, the Reagan Administration terminated all economic
assistance to Nicaragua in April 198167 and embarked upon a policy toward
Nicaragua that included covert support for the anti-Sandinista guerrillas or
"contras" in Nicaragua." The Reagan Administration consistently justified
a policy of support for the contras as necessary to counter Nicaragua's
military escalation and subversive activities against neighboring Central
American states.69 Congressional authorization for continued aid to the
contras, however, abruptly ceased in April 1984 in the wake of revelations
that the Central Intelligence Agency had supervised the mining of several
Nicaraguan harbors.7 0 Not wanting to give the perception that the United
States was deserting a democratic struggle in the Western Hemisphere,
accompanying text (Frente Sandinista Liberacion Nacional soon consolidated power within new
revolutionary government).
64. See 63 CoNG. DIG. 261 (Nov. 1984) (summary of Carter Administration's policy
toward Sandinista government). Although the Carter Administration's policy toward the revo-
lutionary government in Nicaragua initially was one of assistance, in August 1980 President
Carter prevented the disbursement of a number of loans to Nicaragua in response to Nicaragua's
involvement as an arms conduit for a guerrilla offensive against the government of El Salvador.
See CRAWLEY, supra note 62, at 177-78 (Nicaraguan government's assistance to rebel insurgency
in El Salvador gave Washington justification for change in policy toward Managua).
65. See CRAWLEY, supra note 62, at 174-76. In its initial stages, the new Nicaraguan
government was, at least on the surface, a broadly based coalition of anti-Samoza factions. Id.
Soon after the revolution, however, the FSLN began a reshuffling of the government that
quickly placed real power in the hands of FSLN leaders. Id.
66. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 1-7 (Mar. 1981) (report on Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan
involvement in El Salvador's civil war).
67. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 71 (May 1981) (statement of Department spokesman William J.
Dyess) (President Reagan suspended economic aid to Nicaragua due to Nicaraguan support for
insurgency in El Salvador).
68. See CRAWLEY, supra note 62, at 177-81 (discussing Nicaragua's involvement as arms
conduit in Central America and corresponding United States assistance to contras). In 1982,
United States covert assistance to the anti-Sandinista guerrillas became public knowledge. Id.
at 181. From 1981-1984, the Central Intelligence Agency furnished the contras with approxi-
mately $80 million. See 43 CONG. Q. 707 (1985) (discussing United States' covert assistance to
Nicaraguan contras).
69. See, e.g., DEP'T ST. BULL. 22-24 (May 1985) (address by Vice President Bush urging
continued assistance to contras in Nicaragua); 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 569 (May 6, 1985)
(direct pressure, including support for contras, is only practicable means of moderating
Nicaragua's aggressive course of conduct); 20 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 676, 680 (May 9,
1984) (United States has legal and moral right to assist resistance of Nicaragua's subversive
activities in Central America).
70. See 43 CONG. Q. 710-11 (1985) (discussing Congressional decision to discontinue
military aid to contras in Nicaragua); N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1985 at I, col. 6 (Reagan
Administration officials and Congressional sources reveal that CIA supervised mining of
Nicaraguan harbors).
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President Reagan vehemently sought resumption of military aid to the contra
guerrillas. 7' Congress rejected Reagan's request on April 23, 1984.72 Nine
days later, deeming the policies of Nicaragua an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the security of the United States, President Reagan announced a
comprehensive trade embargo against the government of Nicaragua.
73
In analyzing the legality of the economic sanctions imposed by the
United States against Nicaragua, the termination of trade by the Reagan
Administration raises serious questions under international law. 74 The right
of a state to determine that state's own trading partners is a well-established
principle of international coexistence. 7 A state's ability independently to
formulate policies of trade is a derivative of the principle of sovereignty,
which reflects the right of a state to determine that state's own destiny free
from the interference of other nations.7 6 Foreign trade by its very nature,
however, affects other nations of the international community. 77 The prin-
ciple of sovereignty does not allow a state to conduct external relations with
impunity. 78 Rather, a natural consequence of the equal and sovereign exist-
ence of independent states is that international legal obligations are binding
upon states. 79 The foreign economic policies of a state, therefore, are subject
to the limitations of international law. 0
Treaty commitments can constitute significant limitations upon the eco-
nomic conduct of states that have entered into agreements pertaining to
71. See 43 CONG. Q. at 707-09 (discussing President Reagan's request for aid to Nicaraguan
contras).
72. See id. at 779-84 (examining President Reagan's defeat by Congress on issue of contra
aid).
73. See Exec. Order 12,513, supra note 56 (declaring national emergency in response to
Nicaragua's aggressive activities in Central America); see also supra notes 59-61 and accompa-
nying text (discussing economic sanctions imposed upon Nicaragua).
74. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (discussing United States potential
violation of treaties and customary principle of nonintervention by applying sanctions against
Nicaragua).
75. See E. VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 39 (Chitty ed. 1883) (law of nations imposes no
obligation on any state to trade with any other state); C. EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GoVERN-
MENT, 86-87 (3d ed. 1957) (state may prohibit trade with some or all states).
76. See G. Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered From
the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES CouRs 48-50 (1957) (discussing principle of
sovereignty in international law). To say that a state is "sovereign" is to say that the state is
equal to and independent from other states. Id. at 49.
77. See A. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION 409 (1956) (state's external
economic policies concern others and are subject to international law).
78. See AKENURST, supra note 1, at 15-16 (principle of sovereignty does not place states
above international law).
79. See BROWNLE, supra note 10, at 287-88 (general discussion of sovereignty and equality
of states). A state can claim sovereign rights only if that state is ready to concede concomitant
rights to other states and assume obligations under international law. Fitzmaurice, supra note
76, at 49.
80. See Bowett, supra note 50, at 245-59 (enumerating criteria with which to analyze
international economic conduct).
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 43:167
transnational economic relations. 81 The United States and Nicaragua are
parties to the Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter).8 2 Signed in San
Francisco on June 6, 1945, the U.N. Charter is the legal instrument that
created the United Nations, an international organization formed to maintain
international peace and security. 3 Although the U.N. Charter does not
expressly address the area of economic coercion, several commentators have
interpreted article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter implicitly to include economic
and political conduct.84 Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter forbids the threat
or use of force against any nation in any manner that is not consistent with
the purposes of the U.N. Charter. 5 The scope of "force" in article 2(4) has
created much debate.86 The debate centers on the issue of whether or not
article 2(4) "force" encompasses nonmilitary types of force, including eco-
nomic coercion.8 7 If article 2(4) prohibited economic and political coercion
as well as military force, then arguably the United States sanctions against
Nicaragua would violate the prohibition against force enunciated in article
2(4).88 Although no decisive consensus has emerged, the majority view is that
article 2(4) force does not include economic coercion.8 9 The failure of various
81. See id. at 247 (treaty obligations provide sound basis for assessing legality of economic
conduct); see also infra notes 82-155 (discussing treaty commitments between United States and
Nicaragua).
82. 1 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONs A3399 (1984-1985).
83. U.N. CHARTER. See generally GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 11, at 1-17 (discussing
early development of United Nations); see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 400-05 (purpose
of U.N. Charter is to promote international peace and security). As of 1985, 158 states were
signatories to the U.N. Charter. 1 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS A3399 (1984-
1985).
84. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting threat or use of force); McDouGAL &
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 124-26 (1961) (view that article 2(4) does
not prohibit nonmilitary forms of coercion is suspect); H. Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and
United States Pressure'Against Chile: Economic and Political Coercion and the Charter of the
United Nations, 7 CASE W. Ras. J. INT'L L. 3, 18-30 (1974) (discussing different interpretations
of article 2(4) and concluding that current trends require broad interpretation that includes
economic current and political coercion); Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat
to International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 417 (Supp. 1974) (armed force is not only form
of coercion that can violate article 2(4)).
85. U.N. CHaTER art. 2, para. 4.
86. See infra note 87 (disagreement over meaning of force in article 2(4) of U.N. Charter);
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
87. See GOODRICH & HAMRO, supra note 11, at 49 (prohibition of force in article 2(4)
does not encompass economic or political coercion); Bowett, supra note 50, at 245 (pertinence
of article 2(4) in prohibiting economic coercion is doubtful); R. Lillich, The Status of Economic
Coercion Under International Law: United Nations Norms, 12 TEx. INT'L L. J. 17, 18-19 (1977)
(only small number of U.N. members considered article 2(4) to prohibit economic coercion).
See also McDoUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 84, at 125 (suggesting that article 2(4) "force"
should include nonmilitary forms of coercion); Paust & Blaustein, supra note 84, at 417 (arguing
for interpretation of article 2(4) that includes economic coercion); Brosche, supra note 84, at
30 (suggesting that modern interpretation of article 2(4) should include economic coercion).
88. See Paust & Blaustein, supra note 84, at 439 (Arab oil embargo was of such intensity
as to violate article 2(4) of U.N. Charter).
89. See Lillich, supra note 87, at 19 (no evidence exists that more than few member states
of U.N. consider article 2(4) to embody economic coercion); But see Comment, The Use of
Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United
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attempts to include economic measures in the text of article 2(4) supports a
narrow reading of article 2(4).90 Furthermore, an expansive interpretation of
article 2(4) including prohibition of certain economic measures would render
article 2(4) inconsistent with article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 9 Since article
51 justifies acts of self-defense only in response to armed attacks, 2 target
state could not take action under article 51 against an aggressor state that
illegally instigated economic force. 9" Such a compromise of a state's inherent
right to recourse in response to illegal action is inconsistent with the basic
principles of sovereignty and self-defense embodied in Article 51. 94 Thus the
prohibition of force under article 2(4) should not subsume the United States
trade embargo against Nicaragua.
95
The fact that Article 2(4) "force" does not appear to apply to acts of
economic coercion, however, does not render the U.N. Charter void of any
relevance in analyzing the United States trade embargo against Nicaragua. 96
Articles 2(3) and 33 of the U.N. Charter require member states to resolve
their disputes through peaceful means. 97 The United States implementation
Nations, 122 U. PA. L.R. 983, 997-1008 (1974) (arguing for expansive interpretation of article
2(4)). An argument against a narrow reading of article 2(4) is that the framers of the U.N.
Charter intentionally left open the scope of article 2(4) "force." See Comment, supra, at 997.
The framers were aware that forms of coercion other than armed force were bound to arise in
the future, and the open language of article 2(4) would allow that article to function effectively
in response to a changing international community. Id. at 998-99.
90. See U.N. Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 331, 334-35 (1945) (text of Brazil's
proposed amendment to article 2(4) that included "economic measures"). The Drafting
Subcommittee of Committee I/1 at the 1945 United Nations Conference on International
Organization rejected Brazil's amendment to article 2(4) that would have included economic
forms of coercion by a vote of 26-2. Id. at 549. But see McDouGAL. & FEUCLANO, supra note
84, at 124 n.8 (discussing inconclusiveness of article 2(4)'s prepatory work).
91. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting threat or use of force in manner
inconsistent with U.N. Charter); U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (recognizing inherent right of self-
defense against armed attacks); Joyner, supra note 55, at 241 (examining textual inconsistency
between article 2(4) and article 51 right to self-defense if article 2(4) interpreted to encompass
economic force); infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing potential inconsistency
between articles 2(4) and 51).
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
93. See Joyner, supra note 55, at 246 (target state would be left without legal recourse
under article 51 if interpretation of article 2(4) included economic coercion).
94. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes a state's inherent
right to self-defense. Id. Article 51 allows for an individual member state to exercise the right
of self-defense until the Security Council of the United Nations takes appropriate measures to
maintain international peace and security. Id. See also GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 11, at
342-53 (discussing article 51 of U.N. Charter).
95. See GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 11, at 49 (concluding that article 2(4) does not
include economic or political coercion); supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text (discussing
interpretation of article 2(4) "force").
96. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3), 33 (imposing duty on U.N. member states to settle
disputes peacefully); infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text (discussing potential violation
of U.N. Charter articles 2(3) and 33).
97. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3), 33. Article 2(3) obligates members of the U.N. to resolve
international disputes peacefully and without jeopardizing international peace, security and
justice. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3. Under article 33, members of the U.N. have agreed
initially to seek a peaceful solution to any dispute that, if continued, might jeopardize the
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of unilateral economic sanctions does not constitute procedures of pacific
settlement as envisaged by articles 2(3) and 33 of the U.N. Charter.""
Although the United States officially has supported regional dialogue on the
strife in Central America" and has engaged in bilateral talks with the
government of Nicaragua,' °° efforts at reconciliation of the tension between
Nicaragua and the United States have been sporadic.'0' The United States is
not solely to blame for the lack of progress in dialogue with Nicaragua.'
0 2
What is important in the context of examining obligations under the U.N.
Charter, however, is whether the United States made a good faith effort to
resolve peacefully the dispute with Nicaragua prior to the Reagan Adminis-
maintenance of international peace and security. U.N. CHARTER art. 33. Article 33 circumscribes
more specifically the general obligations of members of the U.N. under article 2(3). Id. Articles
2(3) and 33 apply only to "disputes." Id. at arts. 2(3), 33. Although neither article 2(3) nor 33
defines "dispute," the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) has held that a dispute
is a legal disagreement on an issue of law or fact. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case
[1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 2, at 11 (defining dispute), quoted in Y. Blum, Economic Boycotts
in International Law, 12 TEx. J. INT'L L. 5, 13 (1977). The present conflict between the
Sandinista government and the United States falls within the meaning of dispute as espoused
by the PCIJ in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case. See Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Order on
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, May 10, 1984), reprinted in 23 INT'L LEG.
MAT. 468 (1984) (Nicaragua alleging violations of international law by United States); infra
note 153 (discussing Nicaraguan threat to Central America and United States).
98. See Brosche, supra note 84, at 32 (trade embargoes and other forms of economic
coercion are not pacific measures of dispute resolution); Blum, supra note 97, at 13 (economic
pressure is not appropriate means of settling disputes); U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3 (general
obligation of members to peacefully settle disputes); U.N. CHARTER art. 33 (listing peaceful
procedures for dispute resolution). Whili article 2(3) imposes a general obligation upon members
of the U.N. to peacefully settle disputes, article 33 specifically enumerates procedures of peaceful
settlement that states may employ. U.N. CHARTER art. 33. The means by which parties to a
dispute are to seek a solution under article 33 of the U.N. Charter include negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, use of regional apparati, or other
peaceful means of the the parties' own choice. Id.; see GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 11,
at 261-63 (discussing article 33 procedures for pacific settlement).
99. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 59 (Jan. 1985) (statement of United States Ambassador Soronzo
advocating regional peace process in Central America). The primary mechanism for regional
dialogue in Central America is the Contadora Group. See CRAWLEY, supra note 62, at 182-83
(beginning of Contadora process). The Contadora Group consists of four Latin American states
that have resolved jointly to promote peace in Central America. Id. The members of the
Contadora Group are Mexico, Venezuela, Columbia, and Panama. Id.
100. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 84 (July 1984) (discussing United States Secretary of State
Shultz's visit to Nicaragua in June 1984); 43 CoNG. Q. 713 (1985) (Secretary Shultz met briefly
with Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega in June 1984, but suspended dialogue due to lack of
progress).
101. See 43 CONG. Q. 713 (1985) (summary of diplomatic efforts of United States and
Nicaragua toward peace in Central America); CRAWLEY, supra note 62, at 181-85 (discussing
diplomatic activity between Managua and Washington).
102. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 67-74 (June 1984) (State Department report on United States
efforts to achieve peace in Central America alleging Nicaraguan intransigence to be major
impediment to elimination of strife in Central America).
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tration's prohibition of trade with Nicaragua. 0 3 Economic coercion in itself
is not a peaceful measure by which to resolve the dispute between the United
States and Nicaragua2 °4 The termination of all trade with Nicaragua very
likely violates the United States obligations under articles 2(3) and 33 to
resolve its disputes with other members of the United Nations in a peaceful
manner. 05
In addition to the U.N. Charter, the United States and Nicaragua are
parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)'1 6 Opened
for signature on October 30, 1947, GATT is a multilateral convention
primarily created to facilitate access to international trade markets by elim-
inating protectionist barriers and restrictions on international commerce. 07
103. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2. Article 2(2) of the U.N. Charter requires that
members of the United Nations Charter obligations in good faith. Id. One member of the
United Nations has suggested that "good faith" means that states should interpret obligations
objectively and exercise self-restraint in applying rules of the international community. See 20
U.N. GAOR C.6 (874th mtg.) at 199, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.874 (1969) (representative from
Netherlands discussing meaning of good faith), cited in GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 11,
at 41 n.56. The duty of a signatory of a treaty to perform the obligations of that treaty in good
faith is a fundamental principle of international law. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 613.
104. See supra note 98 (economic sanctions do not constitute peaceful measure of dispute
resolution).
105. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3), 33 (requiring that members settle disputes peacefully).
The Reagan Administration has made efforts at ameliorating the conflict in Central America.
See supra note 100 (discussing bilateral talks between United States and Nicaragua); DEP'T ST.
BULL. 67-74 (June 1984 (report on United States efforts to achieve peace in Central America).
Critics of United States Central American policy, however, contend that the Reagan Admin-
istration is not interested in any negotiations that would leave the Sandinista government in
power, even if the Sandinistas agreed to discuss key issues such as Nicaraguan support for
guerrillas in El Salvador and Cuban and Soviet influence in Nicaragua. See P. Gleijeses, Resist
Romanticism, 54 FOREIGN POL'Y 122, 136 (1984) (discussing Reagan Administration's philosophy
toward dialogue with Nicaragua). President Reagan's "Peace Plan" of April 4, 1985 appears
to reinforce the view that the United States is unwilling to accept much less than a political
reorganization of the Nicaraguan government. See 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 416-18 (Apr.
8, 1985) (text of President Reagan's proposal for Nicaragua). The President's offer called for
a cease-fire and implementation of Church-mediated dialogue between the Sandinista government
and the contras. Id. President Reagan linked the peace plan, however, to a March 1, 1985
agreement among opposition forces in San Jose, Costa Rica. Id. The San Jose declaration
called for significant alterations in the Sandinista government, including elimination of the
National Assembly and new elections. See 43 CONG. Q. 713 (1985) (declaration included
proposals for Nicaraguan governmental alteration and Church-mediated dialogue). The Reagan
Administration adheres to the position that insistence on a democratic reorganization such as
that emphasized in President Reagan's peace plan is not inconsistent with good faith efforts at
a peaceful resolution of the dispute between Nicaragua and the United States, because the
government of Nicaragua promised to implement democratic institutions in government when
the Sandinistas gained power in 1979. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 85 (June 1984) (Administration
policy that Nicaragua adhere to commitment of democratic pluralism).
106. GATT, supra note 31.
107. Id.; see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT §§ 1.3, 2.6 (1969)
(examining basic premises of GATT and regulation of international trade); R. Hudec, The
GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 615, 616-36 (discussing
negotiating history of GATT). Ninety states are signatories to the GATT convention, including
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Articles 11 and 13 of GATT particularly are relevant in assessing the legality
of the trade embargo imposed upon Nicaragua. 08 Under article 11, a
contracting party to GATT cannot restrict or prohibit the imports from or
exports to another member state except in certain circumstances.' 9 If a
member of GATT imposes quantitative restrictions on the products of a
fellow member, then under article 13 of GATT the state taking such measures
must apply similar restrictions to comparable products of third states." 0 As
the economic measures taken against Nicaragua represent a zero quota, or a
prohibition against any amount of imports from or exports to Nicaragua,
the United States sanctions violate article 11 of GATT."' Since the United
States applied the trade embargo exclusively against Nicaragua, the sanctions
also violate article 13 of GATT. 112
Although the trade sanctions against Nicaragua appear to violate articles
11 and 13 of the GATT Convention, the United States asserts that the
national security exception in article 21 of GATT justifies the United States
prohibition on trade with Nicaragua.' Under article 21, GATT will not
most of the industrialized western states, a substantial number of less developed states, and
several eastern states. See 1 TREATIES IN FORCE 243 (1985) (list of contracting parties to GATT).
The GATT Convention was a response to protectionist measures such as the import quotas and
high tariff laws that characterized international trade in the 1920s and 1930s. JACKSON, supra, § 1.3,
at 9. GATT has evolved into a widely accepted instrument that, along with the International
Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement, is the most prominent convention regulating international
economic conduct. Id. at 10; International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement, opened for
signature December 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501.
108. See GATT, supra note 31, at art. I1 (prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports
and exports of member states); id. at art. 13 (precluding disparate application of quotas).
109. Id. at art. 11; see JACKSON, supra note 107, at §§ 13.1, 13.3, 19.2 (discussing obligation
under article 11 not to restrict imports from or exports to another member state). The prohibition
against restrictions of exports and imports under article 11 of GATT does not apply to export
restrictions to relieve food shortages, restrictions necessary in applying standards for classifica-
tion of international commodities, and restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries produce
needed to enforce certain governmental measures. GATT, supra note 31, at art. ll(2)(a)-(e).
Additionally, under article 20, GATT would not prohibit any party from taking action necessary
to preserve national morals, protect human, animal, or plant life, export or import gold or
silver, regulate the work product of prisons, protect national treasures, conserve scarce natural
resources, or obtain or distribute products in short supply. Id. at art. 20(a)-j). None of the
exceptions in articles I 1 or 20 apply to the United States trade embargo against Nicaragua. See
supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing economic sanctions imposed against Nicaragua
by United States).
110. GATT, supra note 31, at art. 13; see JACKSON, supra note 107, at § 13.5 (examining
obligations of member states under article 13 of GATT).
I l1. See id. at art. 11 (precluding member state from imposing quantitative restrictions on
imports or exports of other member states); supra note 59 (trade restrictions against Nicaragua).
112. See GATT, supra note 31, at art. 13 (preventing disparate treatment that occurs in
an embargo against one nation); supra note 59 (trade sanctions imposed against Nicaragua).
113. See GATT, supra note 31, at art. 21(b)(iii) (providing for security exception to
obligations under GATT; 40 U.N. SCOR (2578th mtg.) at 27, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2578 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as Security Council] (United States Ambassador Soronzo stated that trade
embargo against Nicaragua fell under security exception of article 21); see also 14 WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 773-74 (1970) (under article 21 of GATT, member of GATT
[Vol. 43:167
1986] ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST NICARAGUA 185
preclude a signatory from acting to protect that signatory's essential security
interests during a war or time of international emergency. 1 4 The determina-
tion of legitimate security interests poses a significant problem in the inter-
pretation of article 21.115 If article 21 leaves claims of essential security
interests solely within the prerogative of a member state, then the United
States sanctions do not violate the terms of GATT."' The potential for a
state to obviate freely its obligations under GATT by claiming that the
state's vital security interests necessitated adverse economic conduct appears
to undermine the very essence of GATT, which is to promote the stability
of international trade through regulation." 7 If one is to judge assertions of
vital security interests in terms of the general goals of GATT, then the
United States action against Nicaragua is not justified under article 21 of
GATT. 118
In addition to the U.N. Charter and GATT, the United States and
Nicaragua are signatories to the Charter of the Organization of American
may take discriminatory measures against coparty to protect essential security interests in time
of war or international emergency).
114. GATT, supra note 31, at art. 21(b)(iii).
115. See JACKSON, supra note 107, at § 28.4. The members of GATT addressed the issue
of who is to determine the existence of essential security interests in 1949. Id. Czechoslovakia
brought a complaint against the United States alleging that the United States export control
licenses against Czechoslovakia violated the United States obligations under GAIT. Id. The
United States argued that the GATT Convention authorized the export control licenses as
security measures under article 21. Id. The members of GATT voted against the Czechoslovakian
complaint, stating that every nation has the right to determine matters pertaining to a state's
own security. Id. The GATT Council recognized, however, that states should not take any
action that could undermine the GATT Convention, thus expressing disfavor with the use of
the security exception in article 21 for political purposes. Id.
116. Id. The members of GATT convened on May 29, 1985, to hear a Nicaraguan complaint
that the sanctions imposed by the United States violated the GATT Convention. See 2 INT'L
TRADE REP. 765 (1985) (discussing GATT action taken on United States trade embargo against
Nicaragua). The GATT Council neither accepted the United States position that article 21
justified the sanctions, nor condemned the trade embargo. Id.; see JACKSON, supra note 107, at
§§ 8.1-8.5 (discussing dispute resolution procedures of GATT).
117. See JACKSON, supra note 107, at § 28.4 (security exception of article 21 provides
dangerous loophole to obligations under GATT).
118. See id. An underlying objective of the GATT Convention is to create a body of
efficacious regulations through which states can conduct international trade relations free from
arbitrary exercises of economic power. Id. The Reagan Administration has deemed Nicaragua
a significant threat to the security of the United States and has instituted an embargo program
in an attempt to influence the future conduct of the Nicaraguan government. See infra note
153 and accompanying text (discussing Nicaraguan threat and objectives of United States
sanctions). Although international political and economic relations are inextricably intertwined,
the contracting parties to GATT have recognized, in a ministerial conference, the undesirability
of restrictive trade practices taken for political purposes. See GATT, BAsiC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, Supp. No. 29 at 11 (1983) (GATT members agree to refrain from
implementing restrictive trade measures for noneconomic purposes). Addressing specifically the
issue of article 21 security exceptions, the contracting parties to GATT acknowledged the
necessity of security exceptions, yet failed to set forth a formal interpretation of article 21. Id.
at 23-24.
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States (OAS)."19 The OAS is a regional agency within the framework of the
United Nations, formed to promote peace and security among the states of
the Western Hemisphere. 120 Article 18 of the OAS Charter prohibits any type
of interference into the internal or external affairs of a member state.'2'
Additionally, article 19 of the OAS Charter explicitly forbids the use of
coercive economic measures by which a state intends to compromise the
sovereignty of another state.'2 2 The United States trade embargo against
Nicaragua immediately appears to fall within the proscription of article 18
because the sanctioning measures severed Nicaragua's economic relations
with the United States, one of Nicaragua's largest trading partners. 2a Article
19 of the OAS Charter, however, is more limited than article 18 and prohibits
only economic conduct that a state employs to subordinate the sovereignty
of the target state so that the coercing state may obtain advantages there-
from. 24 The intent of the United States in imposing sanctions against
Nicaragua, therefore, becomes an important criterion in determining whether
the United States breached article 19.125 The Reagan Administration admits
that the United States terminated trade with Nicaragua in order to pressure
the Sandinista government to alter Nicaragua's course of government and
119. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, as amended Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 5847 [hereinafter
cited as OAS Charter]. The OAS Charter is a regional convention of 32 contracting parties,
and includes all states in Central and South America, Cuba, the Caribbean Islands, and the
United States. See I TREATIES IN FORCE 277 (1985) (listing parties to OAS Charter). Formed to
establish a system of collective security and to protect fundamental rights of the sovereign states
in the Western Hemisphere, the OAS is the product of the Ninth International Conference of
American States held at Bogota in 1948. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 77, at 121
(discussing structure of OAS).
120. See OAS CH-ARmR, supra note 119, at art. I (declaring OAS existence under structure
of United Nations).
121. OAS CHARTER, supra note 119, at art. 18. The principle of nonintervention embodied
in article 18 prohibits military intervention as well as interference against a state's political and
economic elements. Id. Article 18 of the amended Charter of the OAS previously was article
15 of the original Charter of the OAS. See Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the
Organization of American States, February 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, art. 5
(renumbering article 15 to article 18) [hereinafter referred to as Protocol of Amendment].
122. OAS CHARTER, supra note 119, at art. 19. Article 19 of the amended OAS Charter
previously was article 16 of the original OAS Charter. See Protocol of Amendment, supra note
121, at art. 5 (renumbering article 16 to article 19).
123. See V. Pregelj, Nicaragua: Selected Figures and Facts on Foreign Trade and U.S.
Trade Sanctions, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (May 13, 1985) (report of Economics Division of
Congressional Research Service on Nicaraguan foreign trade and United States sanctions against
Nicaragua). The United States was the largest importer of Nicaraguan goods in 1982, accounting
for more than 22 percent of Nicaragua's total exports. Id. at 3. The termination of such a
significant portion of Nicaragua's export market very well could constitute a prohibited
interference into Nicaragua's economy under article 18 of the OAS Charter. See infra notes
175-90 and accompanying text (discussing principle of nonintervention).
124. OAS CHARTER, supra note 119, at art. 19.
125. See id. (prohibiting any state from implementing measures of economic coercion
designed to force sovereign will of target state or garner advantages therefrom).
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cut ties with the Soviet bloc. 26 The attempt to force the Nicaraguan govern-
ment to pursue a course of conduct desired by the United States appears to
be an interference with Nicaragua's sovereign right to dictate the course of
its own government.2"7 The objectives of the United States trade embargo
against Nicaragua, however, may not completely lack legitimacy under the
OAS Charter. 28 Article 22 of the OAS Charter declares that measures taken
to maintain peace and security will not violate the principles of noninterven-
tion set forth in articles 18 and 20. 29 The Reagan Administration states that
the prohibition of trade with Nicaragua is merely part of a comprehensive
policy designed to enhance peace and security in Central America.'30 The
predominant purpose of the United States sanctions against Nicaragua,
however, is to force the Sandinista government to follow a pattern of
behavior that the United States deems advantageous to the interests of the
United States and allies in Central America, therefore violating the express
prohibition of economic coercion in article 19 of the OAS Charter.'
In addition to multilateral,3 2 regional, and international conventions,
the United States and Nicaragua are parties to a bilateral 3 3 Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN Treaty).3 4 The FCN Treaty
accords both parties most-favored nation status 13 with regard to imports
126. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 75-77 (July 1985). A primary objective of the United States
sanctions against Nicaragua was to force the Sandinistas to change governmental policies that
the United States deems subversive and dangerous to Central America and to the.United States.
Id. at 75-76. Other stated objectives of the trade embargo were to manifest a determination to
oppose aggression in Central America and to protect the security of United States allies in the
region. Id.
127. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (purpose of United States trade sanctions
against Nicaragua was to impose change upon Sandinista government).
128. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (United States embargo against
Nicaragua may be valid under article 22 of OAS Charter).
129. OAS CHARTER, supra note 119, at art. 22.
130. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 75-77 (July 1985) (objectives of United States sanctions against
Sandinista government are to maintain peace and security in Central America).
131. See OAS CHARTER, supra note 119, at art. 19. Article 19 of the OAS Charter prohibits
only economic coercion that a state undertakes to dictate the sovereign will of another state
and obtain any advantages therefrom. Id. Although a part of the objective of the United States
embargo against Nicaragua is to facilitate peace in Central America, another purpose of the
economic measures is to force the Sandinista government to follow a pattern of behavior that
the United States deems advantageous to interests of the United States and allies in the region.
See DEP'T ST. BULL. 75-77 (July 1985) (embargo against Nicaragua is part of United States
efforts to pressure Sandinista government to change).
132. See MCNAIR, supra note 29, at 29-30. The term "multilateral" is used most often in
international law to denote treaties by more than two parties. Id.
133. See id. A "bilateral" treaty refers to a treaty between two parties. Id.
134. FCN Treaty, supra note 60. Signed in 1956, the FCN Treaty was an extension of the
post-World War 11 U.S. policy of entering into bilateral trade agreements with other states. See
DEP'T ST. BULL. 174-75 (Jan. 1956) (announcement of FCN Treaty). The United States and
Nicaragua intended the FCN Treaty to provide a legal framework within which to conduct
economic relations. Id.
135. See FCN Treaty, supra note 60, at arts. 14(2), 19(3) (provisions granting most-favored-
nation status to imports, exports and harbor access). A most-favored-nation clause of a treaty
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and exports,' a6 access to ports,' 37 and generally guarantees freedom of
commerce and navigation between the United States and Nicaragua.' 3 Article
14(2) of the FCN Treaty precludes either the United States or Nicaragua
from restricting the imports or exports of the other party, unless the
restricting party applies the same restrictions to all third parties with whom
the restricting state trades.' 3 9 Article 19(1) broadly assures freedom of com-
merce and navigation between the United States and Nicaragua.' 4 Addition-
ally, article 19(3) expressly stipulates that the ships of either party shall have
access to the ports of one another on a basis equal to that which vessels of
other states enjoy. '1' On May 1, 1985, the day that the United States
announced the economic sanctions against Nicaragua, the Reagan Adminis-
tration informed the Nicaraguan government of the United States intention
to abrogate the FCN Treaty in accordance with article 25(3) of the FCN
Treaty.' 42 Under article 25(3), the FCN Treaty would not expire until May
1, 1986.' 43 As long as a treaty remains in force, then the treaty is binding
upon the parties, and the parties must perform all obligations under the
treaty in good faith. 44 The United States, however, terminated all trade with
Nicaragua and denied Nicaraguan vessels access to U.S. ports, beginning on
May 6, 1985, five days after notifying Nicaragua of the United States
intention to abrogate the FCN Treaty. 4- Therefore, the United States violated
articles 14(2), and 19(1), and 19(3) of the FCN Treaty, at least until May 1,
1986, the date the FCN Treaty legally expired.'
46
While the sanctions imposed by the United States on Nicaragua are
contrary to article 14(2), 19(1), and 19(3) of the FCN Treaty, the United
obligates a signatory to extend to the other parties the treaty all trade concessions or advantages
that the signatory has granted to any other state, so that the members of the treaty enjoy trade
relations with one another on the most favorable basis. See 14 WHITEMAN, supra note 113 at §
12 (discussing most-favored-nation clauses in international trade).
136. FCN Treaty, supra note 60, at art. 14(2).
137. Id. at art. 19(3).
138. Id. at art. 19(1).
139. Id. at art. 14(2).
140. Id. at art. 19(1).
141. Id. at art. 19(3).
142. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (United States notification of FCN Treaty
termination); FCN Treaty, supra note 60, at art. 25(3); supra note 61 (discussing article 25(3)
of FCN Treaty).
143. See FCN Treaty, supra note 60, at art. 25(3). Article 25(3) of the FCN Treaty requires
that a party wishing to terminate the FCN Treaty must give the other party one year's notice
of termination. Id.
144. See Vienna Convention, supra note 30, at art. 26. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention
sets forth the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a principle of customary international law that
requires parties to a binding treaty to perform the agreement in good faith. Id. See generally
Kunz, Meaning and Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 180 (1945)
(examining fundamental international norm of pacta sunt servanda).
145. See supra note 59 (executive order to impose sanctions on Nicaragua that prohibited
trade with Nicaragua and closed United States ports to Nicaraguan ships).
146. FCN Treaty, supra note 133, at arts. 14(2), 19(1), 19(3).
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States has asserted that the security exception contained in article 21 of the
FCN Treaty justifies the measures taken against Nicaragua. 47 Article 21(1)(d)
of the FCN Treaty allows either Nicaragua or the United States to take
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security, or to protect
essential security interests. 48 Certainly the activities of the Nicaraguan gov-
ernment concern United States security interests."19 Central America is
strategically important to the United States not only because of the region's
geographic proximity to the United States, but because Central America
borders the Caribbean Basin, a vital passageway for the United States. 50
The activities of Nicaragua, as a revolutionary state in Central America with
Marxist-Leninist underpinnings,' 5' are important to the United States. 52 The
existence of a Nicaraguan threat requiring the exercise of article 21(l)(d),
however, appears dubious.Y13 States must not apply security exceptions such
147. Id. at art. 21. See Security Council, supra note 113, at 27 (U.S. Ambassador Soronzo
justifying United States embargo against Nicaragua as security exception under article 21 of
FCN Treaty).
148. FCN Treaty, supra note 60, at art. 21(d).
149. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 1-5 (June 1983) (President Reagan's address to Congress on
defending U.S. interests in Central America); infra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing
Nicaraguan threat to U.S. security interests).
150. DEP'T ST. BULL. 1-5 (June 1983) (strategic significance of Central America).
151. See S. CHRISTIAN, NICARAGUA: REVOLUTION IN THE FAMILY 128-29, .191-92 (1985)
(Marxism-Leninism is ideological base of Sandinista government).
152. DEP'T ST. BULL. 1-5 (June 1983).
153. See Exec. Order 12,513, supra note 56 (declaring that activities of Sandinista govern-
ment constitute national emergency). Official sources cite Nicaragua's subversive activities,
military escalation, and military ties to the Soviet bloc, including arms shipments to Nicaragua
from the Soviet Union and East Germany, as the basis of Nicaragua's threat to the security of
the United States. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 76 (July 1985) (behavior of Sandinista government
destabilizes region of Central America and therefore represents threat to U.S. security); A
Background Paper: Nicaragua's Military Build-up and Support For Central American Subversion
8-37 (Departments of State & Defense, July 18, 1984) (assessment of Nicaragua's subversive
course of conduct in Central America) [hereinafter cited as Background Paper]. Efforts by
Nicaragua to undermine the government of El Salvador have included training and providing
bases of operations for insurgents fighting the Salvadoran government and acting as a conduit
for arms shipments from Cuba and the Eastern Bloc to the rebels in El Salvador. DEP'T ST.
BULL. 76 (July 1985). Additionally, the United States has claimed that Nicaragua has exported
subversion and political violence to Honduras and Costa Rica. Background Paper, supra, at
26-33. Furthermore, the Reagan Administration points to the dramatic growth in the number
of Nicaragua's military personnel, from 12,000 in 1979 to 102,000 (including civilian militia) in
1984, as posing a pervasive threat to Nicaragua's Central American neighbors and, consequently,
to the security of the United States. See The Role of the U.S. Southern Command in Central
America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1984) (report of Nicaraguan military
expansion). However, commentators doubt the notion that Nicaragua, either independently or
with Soviet support poses a legitimate threat to the United States. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 30,
1985 at 1, col. 2 (Reagan Administration officials privately deny that Nicaragua intends to
move militarily against neighbors in Central America); R. Leiken, Fantasies and Facts: The
Soviet Union and Nicaragua, 83 CURRENT HIsT. 314, 344 (Oct. 1984) (suggesting that military
buildup in Nicaragua is defensive in nature). Although Nicaragua undoubtedly has assisted in
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as Article 21(d) of the FCN Treaty indiscriminately, but with good faith. 5 4
To justify the imposition of a total embargo against Nicaragua under the
Article 21(d) security exception is an abuse of the United States discretion
with regard to the FCN Treaty, and constitutes a failure to perform the
treaty in good faith. '
In addition to treaties and the U.N. Charter, several United Nations
General Assembly resolutions have addressed the issue of coercive economic
conduct. 5 6 Resolutions of the General Assembly, though not binding in a
legal sense, nevertheless represent the expectations of the international com-
munity and provide evidence of the norms of customary international law. 517
the transport of arms to the rebels in El Salvador, the Reagan Administration has admitted
that the recent flow of arms through Nicaragua is "sporadic." Leiken, supra, at 344. Also,
while Nicaragua has increased its military personnel more than eight-fold since 1979, only
40,000 Nicaraguan troops are well-trained men capable of carrying out offensive military
objectives. Central America: The Deepening Conflict, Report of a Congressional Study Mission
to Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, August 28-September 8, 1983 to the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1984) (report of congressional
fact-finding mission) [hereinafter cited as Deepening Conflict]; see also N.Y. Times, supra, at
A-5 (comparative troop strengths of Guatemala, El Salvador are 40,000 and 48,000 respectively).
Significant factors contributing to Nicaragua's military expansion may be the increased United
States military presence in Honduras and United States support for the contra guerrillas in
Nicaragua. See U.S. Policy in Honduras and Nicaragua: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
70, 75 (1984) (increased United States involvement in Honduras military operations and
support for Nicaraguan insurgents exacerbates Nicaraguan course of military escalation). Also,
increased Soviet military aid to Nicaragua may be a direct result of United States support for
the contras in Nicaragua. See Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1985, at 25, col. 1 (United States intelligence
report suggests correlation between expanding Soviet aid to Nicaragua and intensified CIA
support for contras). Soviet military assistance to the Sandinista government grew from $5
million in 1979, to $45 million in 1981. Id. In 1981, Congress authorized overt support to the
contras. Id.
154. See MCNAIR, supra note 29, at 465 (discussing duty of good faith). Parties to a treaty
are obligated to perform that agreement in good faith. Id. The requirement of good faith, in
practical terms, means that a party may not elude an obligation under an agreement by a literal
interpretation of a clause. See Draft Articles on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
With Commentaries, A/CONF. 39/11 Add. 2, 30-31 (1969) (comment on principle of pacta
sunt servanda) [hereinafter cited as Draft Articles].
155. See Draft Articles, supra note 154, at 31. The principle of good faith prevents the
United States from circumventing the FCN Treaty by relying on a convenient provision such as
article 21(d), an article that provides for a significant amount of discretion. Id.; see also THOMAS
& THOMAS, supra note 77, at 413 (discussing abuse of discretion); CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF LAW As APPLIED By INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 132-34 (1953) (same). Although
the requirement of good faith is an integral part of the basis of international legal obligation,
the effectiveness of the principle of good faith in enforcing duties in the international community
continues to be limited. See M. Virally, Review Essay: Good Faith in Public International Law,
77 Am. J. INT'L L. 130, 133 (1983) (examining modern application of good faith in international
legal context). In a practical sense, therefore, the ramifications of a United States violation of
the principle of good faith by invoking the security exception in article 21 are minimal.
156. See infra notes 157-75 and accompanying text (discussing economic coercion in light
of U.N. resolutions).
157. See 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 46-62 (1967) (U.N. resolutions can constitute state practice which
[Vol. 43:167
19861 ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST NICARAGUA 191
The sanctions against Nicaragua are inconsistent with several United Nations
resolutions.""8
An important U.N. resolution condemning coercive economic conduct is
the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (Decla-
ration on Intervention). 5 9 Passed in 1965 by the U.N. General Assembly,
the Declaration on Interventiou forbids the use of economic or political
measures designed to subordinate the will of, or obtain advantages from,
another state.6' In addition to the Declaration on Intervention, the 1970
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (Principles of Friendly Relations) is pertinent in analyzing
economic sanctions under General Assembly resolutions.16 The Principles of
Friendly Relations expresses authoritative norms of economic conduct and
reaffirms the Declaration on Intervention's opposition to the use of economic
coercion as a means of compromising the sovereign will of another state.
62
Although both the Declaration on Intervention and the Principles of
Friendly Relations forbid the use of coercive economic conduct, the resolu-
tions apply only to economic measures that a coercing state undertakes to
subordinate the sovereignty of a target state or to procure advantages for
the coercing state. 63 Therefore, the legitimacy of the Reagan Administration's
in turn can develop custom); R. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General
Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 784-86 (1966) (consensus found in General Assembly
resolutions is part of law-creating process of customary international law). But see S. SCHWEBEL,
The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary International Law,
1979 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 301-05 (1979) (General
Assembly's authority is limited to adopting resolutions, which does not give resolutions binding
quality).
158. See supra note 54 (United States sanctions against Nicaragua); see also infra notes
159-174 and accompanying text (examining economic coercion in light of U.N. resolutions).
159. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 12, U.N. Doc. A/6220 (1965),
reprinted in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 662 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on Intervention].
The General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Intervention by a vote of 109 to 0, with
Malta abstaining. UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK 93 (1965).
160. Id.
161. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970),
reprinted in 9 INT'L L. MAT. 1292 [hereinafter cited as Principles of Friendly Relations]. The
General Assembly passed the Principles of Friendly Relations by consensus. UNITED NATIONS
YEARBOOK 787 (1970).
162. See J. Boorman II, Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon
and the Ensuing Judicial Issues, 9 J. INT'L L. ECON. 205, 215 (1974) (discussing Principles of
Friendly Relations); R. ROSENSTOCK, The Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713 (comprehensive negotiating
history of Principles of Friendly Relations).
163. See Principles of Friendly Relations, supra note 161, at 123, reprinted at 1295. The
Principles of Friendly Relations precludes any state from using economic coercion to impinge
upon a target state's sovereign rights and to secure advantages therefrom. Id. See also
Declaration on Intervention, supra note 159, at 12, reprinted at 663. The Declaration on
Intervention prohibits a state from carrying out coercive economic conduct in order to restrain
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economic sanctions against Nicaragua under the Declaration on Intervention
and the Principles of Friendly Relations turns on the purpose of the United
States in implementing the trade embargo.' 64 If the United States terminated
trade with Nicaragua in order to subordinate the sovereign will of the
Sandinista government or to obtain advantages from Nicaragua, then the
United States has violated the Declaration on Intervention and the Principles
of Friendly Relations. 65 However, if the Reagan Administration did not
intend to detract from the sovereignty of the Nicaraguan government or
acquire any advantage therefrom, then the United States did not violate the
aforementioned United Nations resolutions.' 66 The predominant intent of the
Reagan Administration in ordering a trade embargo appears to have been to
alter the operation of the Sandinista government and force Nicaragua to
follow a course of conduct that met the United States acceptance.' 67 Specif-
ically, President Reagan demanded that Nicaragua cease military support of
Salvadoran rebels fighting the government of El Salvador, that Nicaragua
end military ties with Cuba and the Eastern Bloc, and that Nicaragua
discontinue military buildup and pursue a course of democratic pluralism.' 6
Before coming to power in Nicaragua in 1979, the Sandinista rulers promised
the Organization of American States that, once in control, the FSLN would
institute a broadly-based democratic government and hold free elections. 69
a target state's sovereign rights or to obtain any advantages from a target state. Id. Coercive
economic or political pressure to force a sovereign state to carry out a certain course of behavior
would constitute a "subordination" of that state's sovereignty. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 1,
at 288 (one state may not compel target state to follow course of international or domestic
conduct without usurping target state's sovereignty).
164. See Joyner, supra note 55, at 243-44 (purpose of coercing state is essential element in
ascertaining legality of economic conduct).
165. Declaration on Intervention, supra note 159, at 12, reprinted at 663; Principles of
Friendly Relations, supra note 161, at 123, reprinted at 1295. See also Joyner, supra note 55,
at 243-44 (discussing motive criterion under Declaration on Intervention). The implications of
a violation of either the Declaration on Intervention or Principles of Friendly Relations depend
upon the juridical value that one accords a U.N. Resolution. See AsAMOAH, supra note 157, at
46-62. If one views a resolution as evidence of state practice and as an assertion of opinio juris,
then noncompliance with that resolution may violate a customary rule of international law. Id.;
see also supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (discussing custom as source of international
law). However, if one regards a resolution as a simple vote on a recommendation, the compliance
with which is optional, then the resolution as an expression of binding customary norms is void
of juridical force. See I. MACGBBON, General Assembly Resolutions: Custom, Practice and
Mistaken Identity, INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 17-23 (criticism of resolution's
ability to reflect state practice or opinio juris).
166. See note 163 and accompanying text (prohibition of economic coercion under Decla-
ration on Intervention and Principles of Friendly Relations is qualified).
167. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 75 (July 1985) (statement on sanctions against Nicaragua as part
of United States policy); infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of United
States sanctions against Nicaragua).
168. See 21 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. DOC. 567 (May 1, 1985) (President Reagan calling on
Sandinista government to moderate foreign policy and democratize domestic institutions).
169. See 63 CONG. DIG. 280, 282 (July 12, 1979) (promise of Sandinistas to install
democratically plural government); CHRUSTIAN, supra note 151 at 109-10 (Sandinista promise to
allow coalition of anti-Samoza factions).
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The United States asserts that the economic sanctions against Nicaragua are
an attempt to induce the Sandinista government to adhere to the 1979
promises.17 0 The fact that the FSLN initially made democratic promises with
which Nicaragua has failed to comply, however, does not alter the objective
of the United States in imposing a trade embargo against Nicaragua, which
is to induce an alteration in the Nicaraguan government., In effect, the
United States insisted on the subordination of Nicaragua's sovereign right to
determine Nicaragua's own course of government. 72 As a consequence of
the Nicaraguan government's failure to comply with the Reagan Administra-
tion's demands, the United States ceased all trade with Nicaragua. 73 The
intent of the United States was to compel the Nicaraguan government to
follow a certain course of foreign and domestic conduct by means of
economic coercion; therefore, the embargo violates the United Nations
Declaration on Intervention and Principles of Friendly Relations. 74
An additional means of analyzing the legality of economic sanctions is
the principle of nonintervention. 71 The duty of nonintervention underlies the
important United Nations statements on economic coercion and is a signifi-
cant check on the aggressive economic conduct of a state.'7 6 Under interna-
tional law, the duty of nonintervention requires that a state refrain from
intervening in the internal or external affairs of another sovereign state
against the will of that state.' 77 Economic conduct is interventionary if a
nation carries out an economic policy that coerces a target state to take a
course of action that the coercing state desires.1 7 Because the United States
terminated trade with Nicaragua in an effort to induce the Sandinista
170. See DEP'T ST. BULL. 76 (July 1985) (termination of trade with Nicaragua is element
of United States effort to facilitate change in Nicaraguan government to accord with Sandinis-
ta's promises of 1979).
171. Id.
172. See 21 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 567 (President Reagan's message to Congress
calling on Nicaragua to alter domestic and international practices). The essence of President
Reagan's demands is to compel Nicaragua to change its behavior and structure of government.
Id. Every state, however, has the sovereign right to develop its political status free from external
interference. See Principles of Friendly Relations, supra note 161, at 123, reprinted at 1295
(proclaiming principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples).
173. Supra note 59 (executive order declaring sanctions against Nicaragua).
174. See supra note 163 (discussing requirements of Declaration on Intervention and
Principles of Friendly Relations).
175. See Bowett, supra note 50, at 246 (duty of nonintervention may regulate economic
coercion).
176. See Declaration on Intervention, supra note 159 (general proscription against interven-
tion); Principles of Friendly Relations, supra note 161 (nonintervention listed as one of seven
major principles of United Nations); see also U.N. CHRtaR art. 2, para. 7 (prohibiting interven-
tion into affairs of another sovereign state); Charter of the OAS, supra note 119, at art. 1 (no
state has right to intervene into affairs of another state).
177. See generally THoMAxs & THOMAS, supra note 77 (comprehensive treatment of principle
of nonintervention including duty against economic intervention).
178. See id. at 409-14 (economic policy implemented to coerce behavior of another state is
intervention).
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government to follow a course of conduct prescribed by the Reagan Admin-
istration, the economic measures imposed upon Nicaragua fall into the
category of intervention.'
79
The classification of the trade embargo against Nicaragua as an act of
intervention, however, does not end the analysis of the legality of the
sanctions under the principle of nonintervention.8 0 A state may justify any
economic conduct, including an act of economic intervention, if the state
takes action in self-defense or as a legitimate act of retorsion or reprisal to
secure redress for a prior wrong committed by the target state.' 8' For the
United States to justify the trade embargo against Nicaragua as an act of
self-defense, the United States would have to show that Nicaragua posed an
immediate danger to the security or independence of the United States and
that no alternative means of protection were available to the United States.' 82
While the United States sufficiently has outlined what it deems to be the
Nicaraguan threat,"3 the United States cannot maintain with significant
plausibility that Nicaragua, with a trained army of less than 50,000 troops
and virtually no air force, poses an imminent threat to the United States. 8 4
179. See supra notes 126, 167-68 and accompanying text (objectives of United States sanc-
tions against Nicaragua).
180. See infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text (discussing possible exceptions to
prohibition of interventionary economic conduct).
181. See Bowett, supra note 50, at 249-52 (discussing categories of exceptions to otherwise
prohibited economic conduct). Every sovereign state possesses the right of self-defense and,
therefore, may take action that is necessary and proportionate to secure the state's defense. See
generally 5 WstInEAN, DIG. INT'L L. 971-1048 (1965) (discussing states' inherent right of self-
defense). In addition to self-defense, a state may resort to retorsion or reprisal against a target
state as a legitimate means of self-help. See Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by
Individual States in International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURs 455, 458-61 (1952) (under
customary international law, acts of retorsion or reprisal may justify state's aggressive or illegal
behavior). An act of retorsion is a legal act taken in retaliation to another state's unfriendly,
but legal, conduct. Id. at 458. A reprisal is a retaliatory act that international law ordinarily
would prohibit, but a previous illegal act taken against the retaliating state renders the reprisal
legal under international law. See generally 12 WHrrEaMA, DIG. INT'L L. 148-87 (1971) (reprisals
may constitute legitimate means of self-help under international law).
182. See Bowett, supra note 50, at 249-50 (state that seeks to legitimize coercive economic
conduct as act of self-defense must show that target state represented present danger and that
other means of protection were unavailable). Customary international law traditionally has
required a high degree of necessity to justify coercive conduct as self-defense. See McDOUGAL
& FEaucANo, supra note 84, at 229-41 (examination of necessity includes immediacy of threat
and availability of alternative recourses). In addition to necessity, a state that claims self-defense
must show that the act taken in self-defense was proportionate to the threat that the target state
presented. See id. at 241-44 (requirement of proportionality demands that act of self-defense be
reasonably related to initial threat of target state).
183. See Background Paper, supra note 153 (analyzing growth of Nicaraguan military
forces and subversive activities in Central America).
184. See N.Y. Times, March 30, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (report of Nicaragua's military capabilities
*and comparative Central American strength). The argument that Nicaragua poses a legitimate
threat to its Central American neighbors and, therefore, presents a danger to United States
security interests is more realistic than the argument that Nicaragua poses a direct threat to the
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Nor can the United States maintain that the trade embargo was a legitimate
exercise of self-help under international law. 8s By definition, an act of
retorsion inherently is legal.' 6 However, the United States trade sanctions
against Nicaragua may be outside the legal competence of the United States,
with particular regard to treaty obligations.' 87 Thus, the sanctions fall outside
the parameters of legitimate retorsion. s8 Legitimizing the sanctions as a
reprisal would require that the United States show that Nicaragua previously
had violated international law in an action against the United States, that
the United States had no other available means of redress, and that the trade
embargo was proportionate to the wrongful act committed against the United
States.8 9 The United States is unable to establish the requisite facts necessary
United States, yet insufficient to justify a claim of self-defense. See id. A direct Nicaraguan
invasion of any Central American state would mean instant military retaliation from the
overwhelmingly superior forces of the United States. Id. In addition, as the United States
sanctions may have dire consequences for the Nicaraguan economy, the termination of trade
with Nicaragua may be disproportionate to any actual danger that Nicaragua may pose to the
United States. See McDouGAL & FEuciko, supra note 84, at 241-44 (discussing requirement
of proportionality for acts of self-defense); N.Y. Times, May 2, 1985, at AI0, col. 2 (even
though United States-Nicaraguan trade has declined since 1980, United States still accounted
for 17.5 percent of Nicaragua's total trade). But see N.Y. Times, March 30, 1985, at 1, col. 6
(effect of United States sanctions against Nicaragua may be more symbolic than substantive).
185. See Waldock, supra note 181, at 458-61 (discussing retorsion and reprisal under
customary international law); infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text (discussing possibility
of characterizing United States embargo against Nicaragua as legitimate retorsion or reprisal).
186. See Waldock, supra note 181, at 458 (act must be legal to constitute retorsion).
187. See supra notes 106-55 and accompanying text (discussing treaty obligations between
United States and Nicaragua).
188. See Waldock, supra note 181, at 458. When international law prohibits certain action
by a state, such conduct cannot constitute a legitimate act of retorsion. Id. Thus, an act that
conflicts with the treaty obligations of a state is not retorsion. Id.
189. See id. at 460, citing Naulilaa, 2 REPORTS OF ARBITRAL AwARDs 1012 (1928) (espousing
majority interpretation of customary law of reprisals). The issue of whether the United States
trade embargo against Nicaragua was a legitimate reprisal initially depends upon whether
Nicaragua previously violated international law as against the United States. See id. at 460
(state against which coercing state directs reprisal must have committed illegal act against
coercing state prior to reprisal). The United States has asserted that Nicaragua, by undermining
the stability of other Central American states, has violated the U.N. Charter and the OAS
Charter as against the United States. See Security Council, supra note 113, at 29 (United States
Ambassador Soronzo stating that Nicaragua's subversive activities in Central America violate
article 2(4) of U.N. Charter and articles 3, 18, 20 and 21 of OAS Charter). However, no
objective authority, such as the United Nations Security Council or the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), has determined whether or not Nicaragua committed any international delict
against the United States. See Bowett, supra note 50, at 254 (objective and impartial standards
should apply in determining legality of economic retorsion and reprisal). Even if Nicaragua had
committed an illegal act against the United States prior to the implementation of economic
sanctions against Nicaragua, the United States still would have to show that the United States
had exhausted all other means of redress, or that such means simply did not exist. See Bowett,
supra note 50, at 252 (coercing state must deplete any available means of conciliation). The
United States and Nicaragua have engaged in limited, unsuccessful dialogue. See supra notes
100-01 and accompanying text (listing efforts at United States-Nicaraguan dialogue). However,
the Contadora peace process remains a viable mechanism for the resolution of many issues
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to characterize the economic sanctions against Nicaragua as self-defense, or
a legitimate act of retorsion or reprisal; the trade embargo, therefore, remains
as an illegal act of economic intervention against Nicaragua.' 90
Although the recent economic sanctions imposed upon Nicaragua may
be a politically attractive exercise of foreign policy for the Reagan Admin-
istration, the application of such measures violates a number of specific
treaty commitments as well as customary international law.' 9' By implement-
ing an extensive trade embargo against Nicaragua, the United States has
breached its obligation under the U.N. Charter to settle its disputes in a
peaceful manner. 9 2 The sanctions also violate provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the OAS Charter, and the bilateral FCN
Treaty between Nicaragua and the United States.' 93 Furthermore, customary
international law, as evidenced by U.N. resolutions and the principle of
nonintervention, does not permit the use of economic sanctions designed to
coerce the independent will of another state. 94 The Reagan Administration's
trade embargo exceeds the boundaries of permissible influence, becoming
instead an illicit intervention into the sovereign affairs of Nicaragua.
J. CURTIS HENDERSON
about which the United States is concerned, such as military escalation and foreign military
influence in Central America. See supra note 99 (Contadora process is significant means of
peaceful resolution of strife in Central America). Therefore, the United States could not claim
that the United States had exhausted all other available forms of redress other than the
termination of trade with Nicaragua. Id. Finally, the sudden termination by the United States
of a substantial portion of Nicaragua's total trade may exceed the intensity of any wrong
committed by Nicaragua against the United States, thereby violating a legitimate reprisal's
requirement of proportionality. See Bowett, supra note 50, at 252 (coercing state's reprisal must
be proportionate to illegal act committed by target state); C. Parry, Defining Economic Coercion
in International Law, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (abrupt cessation of established trade relations
may be impermissible coercion).
190. See supra notes 181-89 and accompanying text (discussing potential characterization
of United States sanctions against Nicaragua as self-defense, retorsion, or reprisal); supra notes
176-80 (discussion United States economic sanctions against Nicaragua as act of intervention).
191. See supra notes 81-190 and accompanying text (discussing legality of United States
sanctions against Nicaragua under treaty obligations and customary international law as
evidenced by U.N. resolutions and principle of nonintervention).
192. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text (discussing obligation under U.N.
Charter to settle disputes through pacific means).
193. See supra notes 106-55 and accompanying text (discussing treaty obligations between
United States and Nicaragua under GATT, OAS Charter, FCN Treaty).
194. See supra notes 156-90 (discussing legality of U.N. sanctions against Nicaragua under
customary international law as evidenced by U.N. resolutions and customary principle of
nonintervention).
[Vol. 43:167
